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  We find evidence of a bank lending channel for the euro area operating via bank risk. 
Financial innovation and the new ways to transfer credit risk have tended to diminish the 
informational content of standard bank balance-sheet indicators. We show that bank risk 
conditions, as perceived by financial market investors, need to be considered, together with 
the other indicators (i.e. size, liquidity and capitalization), traditionally used in the bank 
lending channel literature to assess a bank’s ability and willingness to supply new loans. 
Using a large sample of European banks, we find that banks characterized by lower expected 
default frequency are able to offer a larger amount of credit and to better insulate their loan 
supply from monetary policy changes.  
 
JEL classification: E44, E55. 




2. The econometric model and the data....................................................................................8 
3. Results................................................................................................................................12 
4. Conclusions........................................................................................................................18 
Tables and figures ..................................................................................................................20 
References..............................................................................................................................26 
                                                           
§   Centre for Banking and Financial Studies, University of Wales, Bangor. 
*  Bank for International Settlements,  Monetary and Economics Department. Corresponding author. 
**  European Central Bank, Directorate General Research.   
 1. Introduction
1 
In contrast to findings for the United States, existing empirical research on the 
importance of bank conditions in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy provides 
inconclusive evidence for the euro area. More broadly, the overall judgment concerning the 
role of financial factors in the transmission mechanism is mixed.
2 This is surprising, since in 
the euro area banks play a major role as one of the main conduits for the transmission of 
monetary policy and have a pivotal position in the financial system. The weak evidence for a 
“bank lending channel” is probably due to two main factors: first, there are significant data 
limitations, as the bulk of existing evidence was undertaken under the auspices of the 
Monetary Transmission Network in 2002, which was only a handful of years after the start 
of monetary union. Second, the role of banks in the transmission mechanism is likely to have 
changed, mainly because the business of banks has undergone fundamental changes in recent 
years, owing to financial innovation, financial integration and increases in market funding. 
In other words, parts of the banking sector have moved away from the traditional “originate-
and-hold” to an “originate-and-distribute” model of the banking firm, which is much more 
reliant on market forces. As a result, it is likely that this new role of banks has an impact on 
the way they grant credit and react to monetary policy impulses (Loutskina and Strahan, 
2006; Hirtle, 2007; Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibáñez, 2009). 
Some of the latest literature on the transmission mechanism also underlines the role of 
banks, by focusing on bank risk and incentive problems arising from/for bank managers. 
Borio and Zhu (2008) argue that financial innovation, in parallel with changes to the capital 
regulatory framework (Basel II), is likely to have enhanced the impact of the perception, 
pricing and management of risk on the behavior of banks. Similarly, Rajan (2005) suggests 
that more market-based pricing and stronger interaction between banks and financial 
                                                           
1 We would like to thank Francesco Columba, Michael Ehrmann, Paolo Del Giovane, Alistair Milne, Fabio 
Panetta, and participants at the conference “The Transmission of Credit Risk and Bank Stability” (Centre for 
Banking Studies, Cass Business School, London, 22
nd May 2008) for their comments. In particular, we would 
like to thank two anonymous referees for very insightful comments. This paper was written while Leonardo 
Gambacorta was at the Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Department of the Bank of Italy. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and in no way involve the responsibility of the Bank of 
Italy, the ECB or the BIS. Email addresses: Y.Altunbas@bangor.ac.uk, Leonardo.Gambacorta@bis.org and 
David.Marques@ecb.int.  
2 See Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003), Ehrmann et al. (2003b), Gambacorta (2005).   
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markets exacerbates the incentive structures driving banks, potentially leading to stronger 
links between monetary policy and financial stability effects. 
In this paper, we claim that bank risk must be carefully considered, together with other 
standard bank-specific characteristics, when analyzing the functioning of the bank lending 
channel of monetary policy. Due to financial innovation, variables capturing bank size, 
liquidity and capitalisation (the standard indicators used in the bank lending channel 
literature) may not be adequate for the accurate assessment of banks’ ability and willingness 
to supply additional loans. More broadly, financial innovation has probably changed bank 
incentives towards risk-taking (Hänsel and Krahnen, 2007; Instefjord, 2005). 
In recent years, before the 2007-08 financial turmoil, more lenient credit risk 
management by banks may have partly contributed to a gradual easing of credit standards 
applied to loans and credit lines to borrowers. This is supported by the results of the Bank 
Lending Survey for the euro area and evidence from the United States (Keys at al., 2008 and 
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008). The lower pressure on banks’ balance sheets was also reflected in 
a decrease in the expected default frequency, until a reversal in 2007 and more clearly in 
2008 (Figure 1).  
The 2007-2008 credit turmoil has made it very clear that the perception of risk by 
financial markets is crucial to the banks’ capability to raise new funds. Also, in this respect, 
the turmoil has affected their balance sheets in different ways. The worsening of risk factors 
and the process of re-intermediation of assets previously sold by banks to the markets has 
implied higher actual and expected bank capital requirements At the same time, increased 
write-offs and the reductions in investment banking activities (M&A and IPOs) have 
reduced both profitability and capital base. These effects may ultimately imply a restriction 
of the supply of credit.  
According to replies from banks participating in the euro area bank lending survey 
(BLS), the turbulence in financial markets has significantly affected credit standards and 
lending supply. The BLS indicated a progressive increase in the net tightening of credit 
standards for loans to households and firms, especially for large enterprises. A major 
contribution to the tightening has come not only from tensions in the monetary market, but 
also from banks’ difficulties in obtaining capital or issuing new bonds. Concerning capital  
 
7
needs, banks have made recourse to equity issuance on a large scale to compensate for write-
offs. However, due to the higher level of risk, as perceived by the financial markets, and the 
large amount of capital needed, equity issuance has often relied on new classes of investors, 
such as sovereign wealth funds. The reassessment of risk has also affected bond issuance: 
gross issuance of bonds by euro area banks and financial companies declined significantly in 
the second half of 2007 compared with 2006, and remained very weak in the first part of 
2008. All in all, the credit turmoil has vividly demonstrated that the ability of a bank to tap 
funds on the market and, consequently, to sustain changes in money market conditions is 
strongly dependent on its specific risk position. It is therefore highly relevant to investigate 
how the lending supply is influenced by bank risk. 
This paper concentrates on the implications of changes described above for the 
provision of credit supply and the monetary policy transmission mechanism, departing in 
two ways from the existing literature. First, the paper presents an in-depth analysis of the 
effects of bank risk on loan supply, using both an ex-post measure of credit risk (loan-loss 
provisions as a percentage of loans) and an ex-ante measure (the one-year expected default 
frequency, EDF). The latter is a forward-looking indicator that allows for a more direct 
assessment of how the markets perceive the effects of a transfer of credit risk impact on bank 
risk; for instance, due to the use of true-sale securitisation, credit derivatives or synthetic 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Our second innovation lies in the analysis of the 
effects of credit risk on the banks’ response to both monetary policy and GDP shocks. 
We use a unique dataset of bank balance sheet items and asset-backed securities for 
euro area banks over the period 1999 to 2005. The estimation is performed using an 
approach similar to that of Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués (2009), who analyse the link 
between securitisation and the bank lending channel. To tackle problems derived from the 
use of a dynamic panel, all the models have been estimated using the GMM estimator, as 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
The results indicate that low-risk banks are able to offer a larger amount of credit and 
can better shield their lending from monetary policy changes, probably due to easier access 
to uninsured fund raising, as suggested by the “bank lending channel” hypothesis. 
Interestingly, this insulation effect is dependent on the business cycle and tends to decline in  
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the case of an economic downturn. Risk also influences the way banks react to GDP shocks. 
Loan supply from low-risk banks is less affected by economic slowdowns, which probably 
reflects their ability to absorb temporary financial difficulties on the part of their borrowers 
and preserve valuable long-term lending relationships. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
econometric model and the data. Section 3 presents our empirical results and robustness 
checks. The last section summarises the main conclusions. 
2. The econometric model and the data 
Empirically, it is difficult to measure the effect of bank conditions on the supply of 
credit by using aggregate data, as it not easy to disentangle demand and supply factors. To 
date, this “identification problem” has been addressed by assuming that certain bank-specific 
characteristics (such as size, liquidity and capitalization) influence the supply of loans. At 
the same time, loan demand is largely independent of bank specific characteristics and 
mostly dependent on macro factors. The empirical specification used in this paper is similar 
to that used in Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués (2009) and is designed to test whether 
banks with a different level of credit risk react differently to monetary policy shocks.
3 
The empirical model is given in the following equation:
4 
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  (1) 
with i=1,…, N , k= 1, …,12 and  t=1, …, T where N is the number of banks, k is the country 
and T is the final year. 
                                                           
3 For a similar empirical approach, see also, among others, Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), Ehrmann et al. 
(2003a,b) and Ashcraft (2006). A simple theoretical micro-foundation of the econometric model is reported in 
Ehrmann et al. (2003a) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004).    
4 The model in levels implicitly allows for fixed effects and these are discarded in the first difference 
representation given in equation (1).  
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In equation (1) the growth rate in bank lending to residents (excluding interbank 
positions), ln(Loans),
5 is regressed on nominal GDP growth rates, ln(GDPN), to control 
for country-specific loan demand shifts. Better economic conditions increase the number of 
projects becoming profitable in terms of expected net present value, thereby increasing the 
demand for credit (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993). The introduction of this variable 
captures cyclical macroeconomic movements and serves to isolate the monetary policy 
component of interest rate changes (iM). The econometric specification also includes 
interactions between changes in the interest rate, controlled by the monetary policy 
authority, and bank-specific characteristics. The first three bank-specific characteristics are 
standard in the literature: SIZE, the log of total assets (Kashyap and Stein, 1995), LIQ, 
securities and other liquid assets over total assets (Stein, 1998), CAP, the capital-to-asset 
ratio (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2002).  
The fourth bank-specific characteristic, which represents the main innovation in this 
paper, is the bank’s risk position, proxied by two variables. The first variable (LLP) is loan-
loss provisions as a percentage of loans; this is standard in the literature and can be regarded 
as an ex-post accounting measure of credit risk. The second variable is the one-year ahead 
expected default frequency (EDF), which is commonly used as a measure of credit risk by 
financial institutions, including central banks and regulators (see, for instance, ECB, 2006, 
and IMF, 2006).
6 EDF is a forward-looking indicator of credit risk computed by Moody’s 
KMV using financial markets data, balance sheet information and Moody’s proprietary 
bankruptcy database.
7 However, EDF information is not available for all banks. From 1999 
to 2005, the sum of total assets of banks for which Moody’s KMV constructs EDF figures 
accounts for around 52% of the total assets of banks in our sample. For banks that do not 
                                                           
5 As discussed in Jeffrey (2006), securitisation may dramatically affect bank loans dynamics. Standard 
statistics do not take into account that fully securitised loans (i.e. those expelled from banks’ balance sheets) 
continue to finance the economy. We aim to tackle this statistical issue by simply re-adding the flows of 
securitised loans (SL) to the change in the stock of loans, to calculate a corrected measure of the growth rate for 
lending that is independent of the volume of asset securitisation (lnLt=ln(Lt+SLt)- lnLt-1). Securitisation data 
are obtained from the Bondware database combined with other data providers (for more details see Altunbas, 
Gambacorta and Marqués, 2009). 
6 Furfine and Rosen (2006) use EDF to assess the effect of mergers on U.S. banks’ risk. 
7 The calculation of EDF builds on Vasicek and Kealhofer’s extension of the Black-Scholes-Merton option-
pricing framework, which makes it suitable for practical analysis, and on the proprietary default database 
owned by KMV. (For further details on the construction of EDFs and applications, see: Crosbie and Bohn, 
2003; Kealhofer, 2003; and Garlappi, Shu and Yan, 2007).  
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have EDF figures, we have approximated their default probability in two ways: first, by 
means of a cluster analysis; second, by estimating the missing EDF values using a regression 
model. 
For the first method (cluster analysis), we have grouped banks by year, country, bank 
size (big, medium, small) and institutional categories (limited companies, mutual banks, 
cooperative banks). We have then assigned banks with missing EDFs, the value of the more 
similar group. 
For the second method, we used the following model:  
 
10 12
,, ,, , ,
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it h hit k kit it
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EDF a X b C 

    (2) 
where the expected default frequency (EDF) for bank i at time t is regressed on a vector of 
10 banks’ balance sheet variables (Xi,t) and country dummies (Ck) that take the value of 1 if 
bank i has its main seat in country k and zero elsewhere (these dummies have been inserted 
in order to capture specific institutional characteristics). The vector of explanatory variables 
(X) includes: net interest margin over total assets (profitability indicator), other operating 
income over total assets (earnings diversification), liquid assets over deposits (liquidity 
management), cost-to-income ratio (efficiency), non-interest expenses over total liabilities 
(cost structure), equity to total asset ratio (capital adequacy), loan-loss provisions over net 
interest margin (asset quality), interbank ratio (market based funding), net loans over total 
asset (weight of traditional intermediation activity) and securities over total assets (weight 
for investment portfolio activity).
8 
                                                           
8 In order to compare the correspondence between the predicted and the observed values of EDF, we checked 
in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the regression. For the in-sample performance, we have computed 
the mean forecast error and the mean quadratic error for 10 banks randomly excluded from the sample. The 
two statistics turned out to be 0.012 and 0.002, respectively, two values that seems quite contained. However, 
this test is not sufficient to test the goodness of the model because the regression has to estimate values of EDF 
for banks that are not in the sample. We, therefore, also computed an out-of-sample test, as follows: the 10 
banks’ observed EDF values were gathered, then we regressed model (2) for the full sample and computed the 
mean forecast error and the corresponding mean quadratic error for the 10 banks. Also in this case the two 
statistics turned out to be quite contained (0.033 and 0.008, respectively). To further corroborate the reliability 
of the EDF regression, we tested the difference between the mean of the forecasted EDF and the observed one, 




Coefficients ah and bk are calculated to estimate the value of the EDF for those banks 
(mainly small ones) for which the KMV EDF is not available. It is worth noting that the 
average value for the EDF for the whole sample (including estimated values) is higher than 
that for the subset of banks that have an EDF estimated directly by KMV (see Table 1). This 
captures the fact that by means of the estimation method we attach a probability to go into 
default to small banks. By including them into the analysis, the average value of the EDF 
increases. The two EDF measures are slightly correlated with LLP (the correlation if 0.11* 
when the missing values for EDF are approximated by means of a cluster analysis and 0.03* 
when EDF is approximated by a regression).
9  
Bank-specific characteristics refer to t-1 in order to avoid endogeneity bias. Following 
Ehrmann et al. (2003a), all bank-specific characteristics have been normalised with respect 
to their average across all banks in their respective samples, in order to get indicators that 
amount to zero over all observations. This means that for model (1) the averages of the 
interaction terms are also zero and the parameters  j   may be broadly interpreted as the 
average monetary policy effect on lending for a theoretical average bank. 
The sample period is from 1999 to 2005,
10 a period characterised by a homogenous 
monetary regime for all the banks considered. The interest rate used as one of the monetary 
policy indicators is the three-month Euribor rate, which captures the effective cost of 
interbank lending on the monetary market. In the period considered, the dynamic of this 
variable is the same as that of the policy rate (the correlation between the two monetary 
policy indicators is above 98%). 
The analysis uses annual data obtained from BankSscope, a commercial database 
maintained by International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA) and the Brussels-based 
Bureau van Dijk. In particular, we consider balance sheet and income statement data for a 
sample of around 3,000 euro area banks. Table 1 presents some basic information on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
test value is 0.58 with p<0.288, df=9).The output of the regressions has not been included in the text for the 
sake of brevity. All results are available from the authors upon request. 
9 In equation (1) we consider only the interaction between the monetary policy indicator and EDF because it 
allows a more direct assessment of how the markets perceive bank risk as it is a forward-looking indicator. 




11 The sample accounts for around three quarters of bank lending to euro area 
residents. The average size of banks in the sample is largest in the Netherlands, Finland and 
Belgium and smallest in Austria, Germany and Italy. The averages of individual bank 
characteristics differ across countries in terms of capital, loan-loss provisions and liquidity 
characteristics, reflecting different competitive and institutional conditions, as well as 
different stages of the business cycle. 
In Table 2, banks are grouped depending on their specific risk position, using the 
estimated EDFs (very similar results are obtained using the cluster measure). A “high-risk” 
bank has the average EDF of banks in the fourth quartile (i.e. EDFH is equal to 1.13%); a 
“low-risk” bank has the average EDF of the banks in the first quartile (EDFL=0.38%). The 
first part of the Table shows that high-risk banks are smaller, more liquid and less 
capitalized. These features fit with the stylized fact that small banks are perceived as more 
risky by the market and need a larger buffer stock of securities because of their limited 
ability to raise external finance on the financial market. The lower degree of capitalization 
appears to be consistent with the higher riskiness of these banks. However, it is worth noting 
that the standard capital-to-asset ratio used here is not the best measure of the riskiness of 
bank portfolios, which would be captured more effectively by a measure of capital weighted 
by risk (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). Also, low-risk banks make relatively more loans.  
3. Results 
The results of the study are summarized in Table 3. The models have been estimated 
using the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), which ensures efficiency 
and consistency, provided the models are not subject to serial correlation of order two and 
the instruments used are valid (when assessed using the Sargan test). The first two columns 
present the results for our benchmark equation (1) using the clustered and estimated EDFs, 
which lead to very similar results.  
                                                           
11 Only euro area banks that have at least four years of consecutive data are included in the sample. Banks that 
do not report positive figures for total assets, total loans and total capital for any given year are excluded. 
Investment banks, government financial agencies, special purpose financial institutions and foreign 
subsidiaries are excluded. Anomalies in loan growth rates are controlled for by checking for possible merger 
and acquisition activity related to full mergers from 1998 to 2005 in the Thomson SDC Platinum database.  
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Changes in economic activity have a positive and significant effect on loan demand 
(Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993). A 1% increase in nominal GDP causes a loan increase 
of 0.5-0.6%, depending on the model. The response of bank lending to a monetary policy 
shock has the expected negative sign (see coefficients for iM t and iM t-1).  
The riskiness of the credit portfolio has a negative effect on the banks’ capacity to 
provide lending. Other factors being equal, higher loan-loss provisions (LLP) reduce profits, 
bank capital and, therefore, have negative consequences on the lending supply. A similar 
effect is detected for the EDF. The result suggests that banks’ risk conditions matter for the 
supply of loans. As indicated, unlike other bank specific variables, which reflect historical 
accounting information, EDF is a forward looking variable. It reflects “market discipline”, 
including the capability of banks to issue riskier uninsured funds (such as bonds or CDs), 
which can be easier for less risky banks, as they are more able to absorb future losses.
12 In 
this respect, there is evidence that euro area investors in banks’ debt are quite sensitive to 
bank risk. More importantly this sensitivity seems to have been increasing in the aftermath 
of the introduction of the common currency (see Sironi, 2003). As a result, for banks 
perceived by the market as riskier, it would be difficult to issue uninsured debt or equity 
funds to finance further lending, for those banks would find it even more difficult to raise 
public equity in the markets to meet capital requirements (see Shin, 2008 and Stein, 1998).      
The effects of liquidity (LIQ) and capital (CAP) on lending suggest that liquid and 
well-capitalized banks have more opportunities to expand their loan portfolios. Consistent 
with Ehrmann et al. (2003b), and contrary to the result for the US, the effect for size is 
negative, suggesting that small euro area banks are less affected by the adverse implications 
of informational frictions. This can be explained by the features of banking markets in the 
euro area: the low number of banking failures, presence of comprehensive deposit insurance 
schemes, network arrangements in groups, strong relationship lending between small banks 
and small firms (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004). 
                                                           
12 For a review of the market discipline literature, see Borio et al. (2004) and Kaufman (2003). Seminal 
empirical evidence for the US already shows that lower capital levels are associated with higher prices for 
uninsured liabilities (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).   
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As expected, the interaction terms between size, liquidity, capitalization and monetary 
policy have positive signs. In line with the bank lending channel literature, large, liquid and 
well-capitalized banks are better able to buffer their lending activity against shocks affecting 
the availability of external finance (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 
2000; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). The interaction term between EDF and monetary 
policy has the predicted negative sign, indicating that low-risk banks are more sheltered 
from the effects of monetary policy shocks.  
We also analyse the effect of a monetary policy change on bank lending relative to the 
level of the intermediary’s risk. We therefore estimate the impact on lending of a 1% 
increase in the short-term monetary rate using the coefficients reported in column II of Table 
3. The results of the analysis are summarised in Figure 2, where we compare the effect of 
monetary policy change on lending for three kinds of financial intermediaries: the average 
bank for the whole sample (with EDF=0.73%), a low-risk bank (whose risk corresponds to 
the average for the first riskquartile, EDFL=0.38%) and a high-risk bank (the average bank in 
the highest riskquartile, EDFH=1.13%). The aim is not only to verify whether bank risk 
generates different insulation effects on loan supply, but also to obtain estimates of the size 
of these effects in relation to specific risk positions. For each bank, both the immediate pass-
through (over the first year) and the long-term effect are considered.  
Results indicate that, all other factors being equal, a 1% increase in the monetary 
policy indicator leads to a decline in lending for the average bank of 0.6% in the short term 
and -1.0% in the long run. Low-risk banks are on average far more insulated from the effects 
of a monetary policy shock than high-risk banks: the long-term effects are -0.4% and -1.8%, 
respectively.
13  
We also verify the importance of including bank risk with other standard bank-specific 
characteristics when analyzing the functioning of the bank lending channel. To do this, we 
include, in column III of Table 3, the baseline regression (1), excluding the EDF measure 
and its interaction with the interest rate change. In this case the liquidity indicator turns out 
                                                           
13 Standard errors for the long-term effect have been approximated using the “delta method”, which expands a 
function of a random variable with a one-step Taylor expansion (Rao, 1973).  
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not to show the expected sign and its interaction with monetary policy is no longer 
significant. This is probably due to the fact that this simplified regression suffers from 
omitted variable bias, due to the correlation between the EDF measure and the liquidity 
indicator. Moreover, the correlation between the EDF measure and liquidity changes over 
time: it is negative at the beginning of the sample (-0.2*) and becomes slightly positive at 
the end (0.1*). This is consistent with the idea that the liquidity indicator captures the 
probability of a bank default only in the first part of the sample when securitisation is 
limited. It also suggests that banks hold liquidity not only to decrease the risk of maturity 
transformation but also as a buffer against contingencies. With securitisation the 
determinants of liquidity dramatically change and probably relate more to the business 
model and less to risk management. Splitting the sample into two sub-periods (1999-2002 
and 2003-2005), the coefficient of the interaction between the liquidity indicator and 
monetary policy is positive in the first period and not statistically different from zero in the 
second (3.28** and 0.38, respectively). 
The effect of bank risk on lending supply may be different over the business cycle due 
to diverse perception of this risk. We have, therefore, introduced an additional interaction 
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Equation (3) allows us to test for the possible presence of endogeneity between the 
business cycle and bank risk. The results reported in column IV of Table 3 indicate that the 
interaction term   is positive and statistically significant, while other coefficients remain 
broadly unchanged. Hence, the negative effects of an increase in risk on bank loan supply is  
                                                           
14 From now on, we consider in Table 3 only the models that use the estimated EDF. Results obtained using the 
clustered EDF are very similar and are not reported for the sake of brevity. These estimations are available 
from the authors upon request.  
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reduced in an expansionary phase and vice versa because the market perception of risk is 
typically reduced in good times and increased in bad times (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 2001). 
There are several explanations for such observable fact: myopia and herd-like behavior 
(Minsky, 1975, Brunnermeier, 2009), perverse incentives in managerial remuneration 
schemes (Rajan, 2005), widespread use of Value-at-Risk methodologies for economic and 
regulatory capital purposes (Danielsson et al., 2001, 2004), pro-cyclicality of bank leverage 
(Adrian and Shin, 2008).
15 
 In order to check if the different effects of monetary policy on banks with a diverse 
risk profile depend on business conditions, we add to the baseline model (1) the triple 
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Both the coefficients 0 and 1 turn out to be positive, with 1 significantly different 
from zero (1=68.1, with a standard error of 19.5). This indicates that the greater exposure of 
high-risk bank loan portfolios to monetary policy shock is attenuated in good times, 
consistently with a the reduction of market perception of risk story as described above. All 
the other coefficients remained basically unchanged.
16  
The reliability of macro variable controls for loan demand shifts are checked by 
inserting a complete set of time dummies to obtain the following model: 
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  (4) 
                                                           
15 For a discussion of these issues and a focus on reforms to improve financial stability see de Larosière et al. 
(2009), Volcker et al. (2009), Acharya and Richardson (2009), Panetta et al. (2009). The Financial Stability 
Forum (2009) provides a series of recommendations to reduce financial sector pro-cyclicality. 
16 These results are not reported in Table 3 for the sake of brevity.  
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This model completely eliminates time variation and tests whether the macro variables 
used in the baseline equation (nominal income and the monetary policy indicator) capture all 
the relevant time effects. Again, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms do not 
vary significantly between the two kinds of model, thereby supporting the reliability of the 
cross-sectional evidence, as shown above (see column V in Table 3). 
Two additional exercises (not reported in Table 3) were also performed. Namely, we 
introduced a set of geographical country dummies for each model, which are equal to 1 if the 
head office of the bank is in a given country and to zero if it is elsewhere. This allows 
controlling for possible country-specific institutional factors that could alter the results. In 
this case, the interactions between monetary policy and bank-specific characteristics remain 
basically unchanged. 
We also considered a more complete model that also includes a securitisation indicator 
and its interaction with monetary policy.
17 This model tests whether our results could be 
affected by the large increase in securitisation activity in the period examined (see equation 
below): 
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  (5) 
Even in this case no changes occurred to the interaction terms. 
Finally, in order to check for potential biases caused by the use of estimated values 
for a substantial number of banks, we reran all the regressions reported in Table 3, restricting 
the sample to those banks (mainly large ones) for which the KMV EDFs are available. Also 
in this case, the interactions between monetary policy and bank-specific characteristics 
                                                           











SEC , where SL stands for the flow of securitised lending in year t and TAt-1 
represents total assets at the end of the previous year. As for other bank-specific characteristics, the indicator 
has been normalised with respect to the average across all banks in the respective sample.  
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remain basically unchanged with the notable exception of size ( 1 , *    t i j t M SEC i ) which 
turned out to be statistically non significant. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper analyses how bank risk influences bank credit supply and their ability to 
shelter that supply from the effects of monetary policy changes.  
As a result of a very fast process of financial innovation (including the use of credit 
derivatives, the increase in securitisation activity and the new role of institutional investors), 
banks have been able to originate new loans and sell them on to the market, thereby 
obtaining additional liquidity and relaxing capital requirement constraints. We claim that, 
due to these changes, bank risk needs to be carefully considered together with other standard 
bank-specific characteristics when analyzing the functioning of the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy. Indeed focusing on size, liquidity and capitalization may be not be 
sufficient to accurately assess banks’ ability to raise additional funds and supply additional 
loans. Indeed, the 2007-2008 credit turmoil has shown very clearly that the market’s 
perception of risk is crucial in determining how banks can access capital or issue new bonds.  
Using a large sample of European banks, we find that bank risk plays an important  
role in determining banks’ loan supply and in sheltering it from the effects of monetary 
policy changes. Low-risk banks can better shield their lending from monetary shocks as they 
have better prospects and an easier access to uninsured fund raising. This is consistent with 
the “bank lending channel” hypothesis. Interestingly, the greater exposure of high-risk bank 
loan portfolios to monetary policy shock is attenuated in the expansionary phase, 
consistently with the hypothesis of a reduction in market perception of risk in good times. 
Other interesting avenues remain open to further research. In particular, while this 
paper analyzes the link between bank risk and monetary policy effects, a reverse relationship 
may also hold. Namely, monetary policy may affect the risk-taking behaviour of banks and 
other financial intermediaries via asset prices and collateral values (Jimenez et al, 2008, 
Maddaloni et al., 2009). Moreover, if banks were to expect some kind of “insurance” from 
the Central Bank against asset price downturns, this could lead to moral hazard issues in the  
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form of excessive risk taking on average over the business cycle. This calls for a growing 
need for the Central Bank to be able to anticipate excessive risk-taking by means of careful 





Tables and figures 
 
 Table 1 
AVERAGE BANK FEATURES BY COUNTRY  
(1) 
(percentages, millions of euros, expected default frequencies and number of banks)   
  Lending 
  Size


















  (mean annual  
growth rate)  
(EUR mill.)  ( % total loans)  (%  total assets)  (% total loans)      (% total assets)   
Austria
  4.5 3,425 23.7  8.7  3.2  0.4
  0.4 0.72  175 
Belgium
  3.9 23,981 10.8  7.6  1.4  0.1
  0.3 0.02  57 
Finland
  7.4 18,723 11.6  9.4  0.2  0.2
  0.2 0.01  4 
France
  5.2 10,460 13.9  10.0  1.5  0.7
  0.8 1.80  250 
Germany
  2.1 4,699 24.8  5.7  1.0  1.0
  0.9 1.66  1,665 
Greece
  38.4 7,345  13.5  14.2  1.2  1.4
  1.3 0.24  8 
Ireland
  9.3 9,874 17.0  10.4  1.4  0.3
  0.3 0.70  24 
Italy
  12.6 2,058  31.1  13.0  1.0  0.3
  0.5 1.22  579 
Luxembourg
  5.8 6,110 45.2  6.8  4.5  1.2
  1.0 5.69  91 
Netherlands
  6.8 18,803 24.1  9.3  2.7  0.8
  1.4 19.36  31 
Portugal 11.9  7,362 6.5  12.9 1.9  0.2  0.3  10.18  22 
Spain 8.1  15,615  7.5  9.9 1.4  0.1  0.2  1.51  41 
Euro area   5.0  5,400  24.9  7.9 1.3  0.5  0.7  1.93  2,948 
Sources: Bankscope, Eurostat, KMV-Moody’s.  
Note: (1) Expected default frequency (EDF) figures are available for 134 banks, representing 52% of the total sample total assets. (2) Data for missing EDF have been 
estimated by mean of a regression analysis. As a first step, we have regressed the EDF on a number of bank balance sheet variables and country dummies (the latter have been 
inserted in order to capture specific institutional characteristics). In the second step, we have used the estimated coefficients to calculate the EDF for banks (mainly small ones) 
for which the KMV EDF are not available. 
 
 Table 2 
 
BALANCE SHEET CHARACTERISTICS AND BANK RISK PROFILE 
(1) 
Distribution by banks' risk 
(estimated EDF)
Lending Size            Liquidity Capitalization 
(mean annual growth 
rate)
(EUR mill.) (% total assets) (% total assets)
High-risk banks 
(EDF=1.13%) (a)
2.1 6,310 32.7 5.9
Low-risk banks 
(EDF=0.38%) (b)
10.2 8,224 25.4 11.4
Δ=(a)-(b) -8.2 -1,914 7.3 -5.5
 
 (1) A low-risk bank has an average ratio of the EDF in the first quartile of the distribution by bank risk; a high-risk bank an 
average EDF in the last quartile. Since the characteristics of each bank could change with time, percentiles have been 
calculated on mean values. 
 Table 3 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Lt-1 -0.156 *** 0.003 -0.140 *** 0.005 -0.093 *** 0.005 -0.069 *** 0.004 -0.051 *** 0.000
GDPNt-1 0.578 *** 0.093 0.612 *** 0.165 1.479 *** 0.161 0.843 *** 0.121
SIZEt-1 -0.011 *** 0.001 -0.007 *** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.005 *** 0.001 -0.007 *** 0.001
LIQt-1 0.171 *** 0.008 0.153 *** 0.013 -0.019 * 0.012 0.306 *** 0.011 0.196 *** 0.016
CAPt-1 0.006 *** 0.000 0.006 *** 0.000 0.004 *** 0.000 0.005 *** 0.000 0.014 *** 0.001
EDFt-1 -0.051 *** 0.001 -0.020 *** 0.006 -0.127 *** 0.001 -0.046 *** 0.001
LLPt-1 -0.113 *** 0.002 -0.109 *** 0.003 -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.123 *** 0.003 -0.119 *** 0.004
i M t -0.715 *** 0.105 -0.616 *** 0.184 -0.731 *** 0.199 -0.951 *** 0.154
i M t-1 -0.243 ** 0.121 -0.491 *** 0.144 -1.358 *** 0.141 -0.376 *** 0.118
i M t*EDFt-1 -2.090 *** 0.057 -2.343 *** 0.383 -1.202 *** 0.398 -0.855 *** 0.139
 i M t*SIZEt-1 0.705 *** 0.048 0.453 *** 0.082 0.708 *** 0.084 0.342 *** 0.081 0.660 *** 0.091
 i M t*LIQt-1 1.321 *** 0.430 2.968 *** 0.932 1.385 0.917 3.423 *** 0.907 0.800 * 0.440
i M t*CAPt-1 0.181 *** 0.008 0.068 *** 0.021 0.066 *** 0.018 0.061 *** 0.020 0.236 *** 0.035
GDPt*EDFt-1 1.190 *** 0.140
Constant 0.034 *** 0.002 0.030 *** 0.003 0.013 *** 0.003 0.017 *** 0.003 0.035 *** 0.005
Time dummies  NO NO NO NO YES
Sample period
No. of banks, no. of 
observations 2,947 15,405 2,947 15,405 2,947 15,405 2,947 15,405 2,947 15,405
Sargan test (2nd step; pvalue) 0.383 0.140 0.130 0.200 0.290
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.147
         Baseline Model          
   (without EDF variables)
1999-2005 1999-2005
The model is given by the following equation, which includes interaction terms that are the product of the monetary policy indicator and a bank specific characteristic:
with i=1,…, N  and  t=1, …, T and where: N = number of banks; Lit= loans in the balance sheet of bank i in quarter t; i Mt = monetary policy indicator; GDPNit = 
nominal GDP; SIZEit=log of total assets; LIQit=liquidity ratio; CAPit=capital to asset ratio; LLPit=loan loss provision over total assets; EDFit =Expected default 
frequency. One lag has been introduced in order to obtain white noise residuals. The interactions terms and control variables that turned out not to be statistically 
significant in all the models have been removed from the table. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent 
respectively.
1999-2005 1999-2005 1999-2005
(V)                   
Dependent variable: annual 
growth rate of lending (Lt)
             Time dummies      
         (Estimated EDF)
         Baseline Model        
(Estimated EDF)
Banks' risk and the 
business cycle (Estimated 
EDF)
(II)                     (IV)                    (I)                    
         Baseline Model         
 (Cluster analysis)
(III)                    
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 Figure 1
EXPECTED DEFAULT FREQUENCY 






























Source: Moody’s KMV..  Figure 2
EFFECT OF A ONE PER CENT INCREASE OF THE MONETARY 
























Note: We evaluate the effect of a one per cent increase of the short-term interest rate on bank lending considering banks with a different 
EDF (Expected Default Frequency). The coefficients are calculated on the base of the benchmark model in Table 3 with estimated EDF. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent respectively. 
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